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I. INTRODUCTION 
Municipal governments stand in a difficult position. Municipalities 
are ultimately subservient to the greater powers of the state govern-
ment and the federal government.1 At the same time, municipalities ar-
guably have a more immediate and compelling impact on the day-to-day 
lives of their local residents than any other government.2 A local gov-
ernment is considered a creature of the state that created it and is 
deemed to be carrying out the functions of the state in a local setting.3 A 
local government exercises power only to the extent that its creating 
state allows.4 Local governments then seem to stand in a strange middle 
ground where all are expected to use powers to take care of the locality 
but are still subject to greater powers.5 
A particularly difficult situation is where one greater power re-
quires action from a local government while another binds its hands.6 
This sometimes is the case when it comes to federal mandates. The fed-
eral government can impose mandates on local governments, which 
usually require the local government to take additional actions and find 
funding, and at the same time, because municipalities are creatures of 
state, municipalities are limited by what actions each entity can take to 
comply with federal mandates.7 Many issues arise from this situation. 
In particular, when a federal mandate requires a local government to 
take on additional expenses to maintain compliance, a municipality can 
come under serious financial strain if they are not given the power to 
address the costs through taxes, fees, or other means.8 
                                                     
 
 1. See infra Part III.B. 
 2. See generally James S. Macdonald & Jacqueline R. Papez, Over 100 Years 
Without True “Home Rule” in Idaho: Time for Change, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 587 (2010). 
 3. Michael A. Lawrence, Do ‘Creatures of the State’ Have Constitutional Rights?: 
Standing for Municipalities to Assert Procedural Due Process Claims Against the State, 47 
VILL. L. REV. 93, 96 (2002). 
 4. See, e.g., Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6. 
 5.. Macdonald, supra note 2, at 610–11. 
 6. Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an 
Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 961 (2007). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Thomas Atwood, Home Rule: How States Are Fighting Unfunded Federal Man-
dates, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 28, 1994), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1994/12/bg1011nbsp-home-rule-how-states. 
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The economic downturn of the last five years has led to financial 
strain across the nation.9 Cities have not been immune from the effects 
of this downturn, and many cities have been suffering from financial 
strain for many years.10 The City of Detroit recently filed bankruptcy 
and other municipalities have also resorted to bankruptcy.11 More fi-
nancial strain imposed by federal mandates on financially weak cities 
could be the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s back. An under-
standing of what the political pressures are, how they affect municipali-
ties, and the obstacles to overcoming them can lead to greater efficiency 
and reduce the strain on local governments. 
In addressing the financial strain placed on local governments by 
federal mandates, local leaders will have to take an “all-available-
methods”12 approach, assessing each municipality’s own particular 
needs and implementing solutions in the face of both federal mandates 
and state restrictions on municipal authority. This article attempts to 
set out an example of the relationship between local, state, and federal 
power and through this example create a framework for local govern-
ments to address the strain of federal mandates in the face of state re-
strictions. I will begin with a case study from a recent Idaho Supreme 
Court case, analyzing the background and issues of the case and its ul-
timate outcome. From this case study I will identify a typical situation 
where a city is placed under the strain of federal power while being re-
strained by state power and offer some criticism of the Court’s holding. I 
will then identify and discuss the obstacles facing municipalities in ad-
dressing federal mandates and possible solutions to these obstacles, fo-
cusing on the criticisms of the case study. These discussions on obstacles 
and solutions will include both legal and practical aspects. I will then 
conclude by suggesting an approach that a municipality or other form of 
local government13 might take in addressing a similar issue in their ar-
ea. The main framework I will be working under in this article is a situ-
ation where a city is dealing with a federal environmental mandate, the 
Clean Water Act (CWA), but this article should be helpful in addressing 
any situation where a city faces federal mandates and state restrictions. 
                                                     
 9. Peter Ferrara, The Worst Five Years Since the Great Depression, FORBES (Feb. 
7, 2013, 10:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2013/02/07/the-worst-five-years-
since-the-great-depression/. 
 10. Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 
B.U.L. REV. 633, 633–34 (2008). 
 11. Ryan Holeywell, Detroit Files for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, GOVERNING VIEW (Ju-
ly 18, 2013), http://www.governing.com/blogs/view/Detroit-Bankruptcy.html. 
 12. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN WATERSHEDS NEEDS SURVEY 2008: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 3–7 (2008) [hereinafter EPA]. 
 13. I use the words “city” and “local government” interchangeably with the word 
“municipality.” While the focus of this article is municipalities, all governments created by 
the state, whether county, city, or otherwise, are local governments. However, generally the 
use of any of these words in this article refer to municipalities. 
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II. CASE STUDY: CITY OF LEWISTON STORMWATER ORDINANCE 
A recent case from the Idaho Supreme Court, Lewiston Independ-
ent School District. Number 1 v. City of Lewiston illustrates the funda-
mental difficulty of unfunded and underfunded federal mandates.14 This 
case presents a helpful framework to explain a typical situation where a 
city in Idaho may try to generate revenue to create or free up funds 
needed for compliance with federal environmental mandates. Again, 
broader application to other federal mandates is encouraged, but this 
case gives context for this article. 
A. Case Background 
The City of Lewiston (Lewiston) is required by the CWA to obtain a 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit to 
discharge stormwater into receiving waters of the United States.15 
NPDES permits require that cities implement required technologies to 
reduce pollutant loads and ensures that pollutant levels meet federal 
CWA standards.16 
Lewiston enacted Ordinance No. 4512 to create a stormwater utili-
ty and a stormwater fee in order to comply with these federal man-
dates.17 The fee was the particularly controversial part of the ordinance 
that eventually brought the ordinance in front of the state Supreme 
Court.18 The stormwater fee was assessed on all property owners accord-
ing to the amount of impervious surface on their properties.19 The plain-
tiffs, a number of government entities that were subject to the fee, chal-
lenged the fee on the grounds that it was actually a disguised tax and 
therefore invalid because there existed no legislative authority to im-
pose the tax.20 Legislative authority to tax is vested in the state legisla-
ture, and any taxing done by a municipality must be authorized by the 
legislature.21 Furthermore, the Idaho Constitution disallows municipali-
ties from taxing other governmental units.22 On this basis, the govern-
                                                     
 14. See generally Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Lewiston, 264 P.3d 907, 
151 Idaho 800 (2011). 
 15. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2008). 
 16. OFFICE OF WASTEWATER MGMT., WATER PERMITTING 101 (2012). 
 17. Lewiston, 264 P.3d at 909, 151 Idaho at 802. 
 18.. Id. at 911, 151 Idaho at 804. 
 19. Id. at 909, 151 Idaho at 802 (“the only exemptions from the stormwater fee are 
if the property is less than 2000 square feet as identified in the Nez Perce County property 
database, the property is classified as undeveloped, or the owner qualifies for ‘circuit breaker’ 
status”). 
 20. Id. at 908, 151 Idaho at 801. 
 21. IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 6 (“The legislature shall not impose taxes for the pur-
pose of any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, but may by law invest in the 
corporate authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all pur-
poses of such corporation.”). 
 22. IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 4 (“The property of the United States, except when 
taxation thereof is authorized by the United States, the state, counties, towns, cities, villag-
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mental units in Lewiston subject to the ordinance filed suit seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the city had acted outside of its authority.23 
B. Case Analysis 
The Court analyzed this case around the legal distinction between 
a tax and a fee.24 The fundamental difference between a tax and a fee is 
that a tax is created to raise revenue to pay for a service what benefits 
the public at large while a fee is a payment made by an individual or 
entity that is for specific services rendered to them.25 A fee is the appli-
cation of a rate to the base of usage or service rendered.26 A tax is appli-
cable to all qualifying members of the public regardless of their use of 
the systems that the tax goes to pay for.27 In other words: 
Any payment exacted by the State or its municipal subdivisions 
as a contribution toward the cost of maintaining governmental 
functions, where the special benefits derived from their perfor-
mance are merged in the general benefit, is a tax. A "fee" is a 
charge for a direct public service rendered to the particular con-
sumer while a "tax" is a forced contribution by the public at 
large to meet public needs; a fee's purpose is regulation while 
taxes are primarily revenue raising measures. Unlike taxes, fees 
are charged in exchange for a particular governmental service 
that benefits the party paying the fee in a manner not shared by 
other members of society. Fees, unlike taxes, are collected not to 
raise revenues but to compensate the governmental entity 
providing the services for its expenses. In distinguishing fees 
from taxes, fees are paid by choice in that the party paying the 
fee has the option of not utilizing the governmental service and 
thereby avoiding the charge.28 
In sum, the distinction between a tax and a fee is in the definition 
of the benefit, whether the benefit is to the general public or for a specif-
ic service rendered. 
Idaho case law approaches the distinction between a tax and a fee 
by asking whether a fee is really a disguised tax.29 The Court applied 
                                                                                                                           
es, school districts, and other municipal corporations and public libraries shall be exempt 
from taxation . . . .”). 
 23. Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Lewiston, 264 P.3d 907, 908, 151 
Idaho 800, 801 (2011). 
 24. Id. at 912, 151 Idaho at 805. 
 25. See 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 3 (2012). 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. 71 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 12 (2012) (citations omitted). 
 29. See Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Lewiston, 264 P.3d 907, 912, 151 
Idaho 800, 805 (2011). 
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the two-part test in Loomis to determine whether a fee imposed by a 
municipal corporation is a disguised tax.30 In Loomis the Court said that 
a court applying the test must, “[f]irst . . . determine whether the . . . fee 
constitutes an impermissible tax. Secondly, [the court] must determine 
whether the . . . fee is appropriately and reasonably assessed.”31 Essen-
tially, any purported fee must pass two tests.32 The first test might be 
considered a smell test or a type of “first glance” test. A court applying 
the test will first determine if the fee is actually a tax by looking to the 
purpose and effect of the fee.33 If a fee passes the first test and is deter-
mined to be a fee rather than a tax, it must pass the second test of being 
appropriately and reasonably assessed.34 The Loomis test follows the 
reasoning articulated in an earlier Idaho case that required all fees im-
posed by a municipal corporation to be “reasonably related to a regula-
tory purpose.”35 This reasoning led to the nexus or relationship require-
ment as described in Lewiston Independent School District.36 Essential-
ly, if the fee really is a fee, it might still be considered a tax if there is 
not a close enough nexus between the fee and the regulatory purpose it 
asserts to be related to. 
The Court applied the above analysis and found that the fee in Or-
dinance 4512 did not pass the initial test of being a fee rather than a 
tax.37 The fee in its purpose and effect seemed to the Court to have all 
the badges of being a tax.38 
The Court first looked to the language of the ordinance to deter-
mine the purpose of the fee.39 Ordinance 4512 states in the explanatory 
paragraphs before the text of the ordinance that establishing the 
stormwater utility and collecting the taxes is a way to, “provide[] the 
funding necessary to enable on-going maintenance, operation, regula-
tion, water quality management and improvement of the system….”40 
Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the enforcement and 
explanation of the fee persuaded the Court that the only concern of 
those who made the ordinance was to generate revenue and free up gen-
eral funds for the city.41 The Court noted that the Stormwater Program 
Coordinator said that the fee was “like ‘police services’ in that it ‘bene-
                                                     
 30. Id. at 912, 151 Idaho at 805 (citing Loomis v. City of Hailey, 807 P.2d 1272, 
1275, 119 Idaho 434, 437 (1991)). 
 31. Loomis, 807 P.2d at 1275, 119 Idaho at 437  
 32.. See id. at 1275, 119 Idaho at 437. 
 33. See Lewiston, 264 P.3d at 912–13, 151 Idaho at 805–06. 
 34. See Loomis, 807 P.2d at 1275, 119 Idaho at 437. 
 35. Lewiston, 264 P.3d at 912, 151 Idaho at 805 (citing Brewster v. City of Poca-
tello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988)). 
 36. See Lewiston, 264 P.3d at 912, 151 Idaho at 805. 
 37. Id. at 912–14, 151 Idaho at 805–07. 
 38. Id. at 912–14, 151 Idaho at 805–07. 
 39. Id. at 912, 151 Idaho 805. 
 40. Lewiston, ID, Ordinance 4512 (2008). 
 41. Lewiston, 264 P.3d at 912–13, 151 Idaho at 805–06. 
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fits the public generally.’”42 Also, literature created to help explain the 
fee to the public explains that the reason all landowners must pay the 
fee, even if they do not contribute any stormwater, is because it is part 
of the price that they all pay for living in a community.43 The Court 
stated that, “[t]his benefit is no different from the privilege shared by 
the general public, much like the public’s use of city streets or police and 
firefighter services.”44 
Analyzing the way the rate structure of the fee was set up further 
supports this idea.45 Because the fee each property owner was to pay 
was determined by the number of ERUs (equivalent residential units) 
on the property, and there was no actual knowledge of how much 
stormwater each particular property contributes to the overall storm-
water flow, the Court found that there was no evidence that the fee was 
based on the direct service provided by the stormwater utility.46 The 
Court concluded that these characteristics of the ordinance made it 
plain that the fee was really a tax.47 
The Court did not find Lewiston’s arguments persuasive.48 Lewis-
ton cited to authority for the ordinance, but the Court held that in citing 
to authority, but never really arguing the authority, the city waived the 
issue on appeal.49 Lewiston argued police powers as a source of authori-
ty and some other sources of authority, but the Court did not see how 
they could be argued at that stage.50 
The fee could not pass the first step of the Loomis test in the eyes of 
the Court, and ultimately, citing to authority, the Court could only see 
the fee as a tax.51 
C. Case Commentary 
This case shows how powerless Idaho cities sometimes are when it 
comes to raising revenue to pay for local needs. But when the court re-
stricts its analysis to the narrow legal distinction between a tax and a 
fee, there is little room to justify the ordinance. If the Court in Lewiston 
Independent School District could have analyzed the situation on the 
ground, if it understood the realities of stormwater management, the 
likelihood that it would have come to the same conclusion would have 
been reduced. There are three reasons the Court in Lewiston Independ-
                                                     
 42. Id. at 913, 151 Idaho at 806. 
 43. Id. at 913, 151 Idaho at 806. 
 44. Id. at 913, 151 Idaho at 806. 
  45. Id. at 913–14, 151 Idaho at 806–07. 
 46. Lewiston, 264 P.3d at 914, 151 Idaho at 807. 
 47. Id. at 914, 151 Idaho at 807. 
 48.  Id. at 914–15, 151 Idaho at 807–08. 
 49. Id. at 915, 151 Idaho at 808. 
 50. Id. at 915, 151 Idaho at 808. 
 51.  Lewiston, 264 P.3d at 915, 151 Idaho at 808. 
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ent School District came to the wrong conclusion regarding the munici-
pal stormwater fee: the tax/fee issue was too narrow and formalistic to 
base a decision on in the case, the Court misunderstood the science be-
hind stormwater, and the Court failed to recognize the legal regime of 
the CWA. 
1. The tax/fee issue is too narrow and formalistic to base a decision on in 
this case 
The first reason the Court came to the wrong conclusion is because 
it based its decision on the overly simplistic and formalistic distinction 
between a tax and a fee. In a way, the Court treated the analysis like 
the famous duck test: if it looks like a duck, and swims like a duck, and 
quacks like a duck, it is a duck. In other words, if something called a fee 
has tax characteristics, it is a tax. Idaho is not the only state where the 
courts have decided similar cases based on the tax-fee distinction.52 In 
Bolt v. City of Lansing the City of Lansing, Michigan enacted an almost 
identical city ordinance to pay for CWA and NPDES requirements, spe-
cifically related to stormwater and sewage overflow.53 The city created a 
fee for EHA (equivalent hydraulic area), which calculated the impervi-
ous and permeable surfaces on a property.54 The Court ultimately held 
that the fee was a tax rather than a valid user fee.55 The Court stated 
that to hold otherwise would allow a municipality to redefine almost any 
government activity as a service and charge fees for those services.56 
The problem with this reasoning is that it ignores the true nature 
of stormwater. Stormwater is not just a concept that humans have made 
up to talk about what happens when it rains on a city street.57 Storm-
water is, “an environmental process, joining the atmosphere, the soil, 
vegetation, land use, and streams, and sustaining landscapes.”58 The 
Court in Lewiston Independent School District took the stance that 
stormwater is something that either a property produces or does not 
produce.59 This is because the City of Lewiston conceded that there were 
properties being charged the stormwater fee that had their own storm-
water systems or were not connected to the stormwater system of the 
city.60 If stormwater is looked at from a different viewpoint—the view-
point that stormwater is something that all properties in a watershed 
create—there would probably be a stronger argument to be made for 
assessing stormwater fees on all property owners. This kind of reason-
                                                     
 52.  E.g., Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264 (Mich. 1998). 
 53. Id. at 266–67. 
 54. Id. at 267 
 55. Id. at 272–73. 
 56. Id. at 273. 
 57. See BRUCE K. FERGUSON, INTRODUCTION TO STORMWATER 1 (1998). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Lewiston, 264 P.3d at 914, 151 Idaho at 807. 
 60. Id. at 914, 151 Idaho at 807. 
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ing would be analogous to why garbage fees can be assessed on all 
households based on the presumption that all households create waste. 
To expand on this analogy, one must first understand the policy 
behind why garbage fees in Idaho can be assessed on all households. A 
perfect example of this comes from an Idaho Supreme Court decision 
distinguishing between a tax and a fee.61 The Idaho Supreme Court ar-
ticulated in that case how the Idaho Legislature both empowered and 
mandated county commissioners to find landfill sites and implement 
solid waste disposal systems.62 The policy behind the granted authority 
was articulated in the Idaho Code as being: 
[F]or the purpose of maintaining the natural and esthetic set-
ting of our land, water and air resources; for the purpose of 
providing a means for reclamation of otherwise unusable land 
areas; and for the purposes of such other cultural, social, eco-
nomic and sanitation reasons as may be necessary from time to 
time.63 
The Court went on to justify the city’s solid waste disposal system: 
We now come to the association's first issue: whether a residence 
dweller can opt out by not requesting the service. The associa-
tion argues that not all residential property owners use the sys-
tem or benefit from it, and therefore the mandatory $54 charge 
on all habitable residences is unreasonable due to the use vari-
ance among residences. 
Under the ordinance, none can opt out. When the commissioners 
imposed the $54 charge, they were treating owners of habitable residen-
tial dwellings as “users of the [system].” Their basic premise was that all 
humans live in residences and create solid waste, and whether they put 
it in their own trash cans or someone else's, or on the street, the refuse 
ultimately ends up in the same place, an authorized county waste dis-
posal site (landfill). 
No one suggests that each and every residence generates the same 
amount of solid waste. Presumably, the precise annual cubic yardage of 
solid waste from each residence could be painstakingly monitored and 
determined for each residence by county employees. However, all users 
would have to pay substantially more to cover the additional salaries of 
trash monitors. A solid waste disposal system is comparable to a sewer 
system. Charging a flat residential sewage fee is reasonable even 
though the actual use (outflow volume) varies somewhat from house to 
                                                     
 61. See Kootenai Cnty. Prop. Ass’n v. Kootenai County., 769 P.2d 553, 557, 115 
Idaho 676, 680 (1989). 
 62. Id. at 555, 115 Idaho at 678 (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-4403 (2006)). 
 63. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-4401 (2006). 
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house. The legislature has not imposed exacting rate requirements upon 
localities for measuring actual residential solid waste disposal or sew-
age use. Reasonable approximation is all that is necessary.64 
The comparison between solid waste and stormwater is easily 
made. All property creates stormwater just like all residences create 
solid waste.65 Naturally, water flows downhill in predictable patterns 
according to physics and, according to watershed science, ends up in the 
same place just like all refuse ends up in the same place.66 
The reason for this comparison is to show that Idaho courts are 
able to do this kind of analysis and are not constricted to determining 
the stormwater fee issue in Lewiston Independent School District simp-
ly based on the distinction between a fee and a tax. When courts under-
stand the science of stormwater and the legal regime of the CWA, courts 
should be able to come to the conclusion that municipalities have the 
power to impose stormwater fees. 
2. The Court misunderstands the science behind stormwater 
In light of the first criticism, the second reason the Court came to 
the wrong conclusion was its fundamental misunderstanding of storm-
water science and the problem of stormwater. The basic presumption 
that the Court should have used in its decision is that all property cre-
ates stormwater. The reason the Court should have used this presump-
tion is because the basic academic understanding of hydrology has long 
recognized that stormwater is a process that occurs naturally, and hu-
mans merely interact with that process.67 Stormwater is a function of 
multiple factors including rainfall intensity, catchment size, rate of run-
off, and time.68 When people use land or urbanize within a watershed, 
the result is that the factors of the stormwater equation may be 
changed,69 but the process is still one that naturally exists.70 Basically, 
water precipitates, lands on the ground, and must run downhill; storm-
water is not just something that exists because we build roads and 
                                                     
 64. Kootenai Cnty Prop. Ass’n., 769 P.2d at 555–56, 115 Idaho at 678–79 (citations 
omitted). 
 65. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 66. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 67. FERGUSON, supra note 57, at 1. 
 68. PETE KOLSKY, STORM DRAINAGE: AN ENGINEERING GUIDE TO THE LOW-COST 
EVALUATION OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 5–7 (1998).  
 69. Many scholars see urbanization as the main human factor contributing to the 
stormwater problem. See FERGUSON, supra note 57, at 3–4; COMM. ON REDUCING 
STORMWATER DISCHARGE CONTRIBUTIONS TO WATER POLLUTION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 
OF THE NAT’L ACADS., URBAN STORMWATER MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 13 
(2009)[hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL]. Particularly, the steady increase in impervi-
ous surfaces in urban areas due to the need to accommodate the automobiles has increased 
the rate of flow of stormwater. See FERGUSON, supra note 57, at 3–4. This increase in storm-
water flow combined with higher level of pollutants from urban development has increased 
the amount of pollutants discharged into the nation’s waters.  Id. at 6–7. 
 70. Id. at 1. 
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streets and have a city.71 A second basic understanding in hydrology 
science is the existence of naturally occurring watersheds.72 Water that 
falls on a large area will flow in predictable patterns based on physics, 
following the path of least resistance, and will eventually discharge into 
larger bodies of water.73 Every bit of land on this earth is part of a wa-
tershed and wherever a city is built, it was built on a watershed.74 
The understanding of these two concepts—that stormwater is a 
naturally occurring process and that all cities are built on preexisting 
watersheds—leads to an understanding of the problem of stormwater 
for cities. When rain falls on a city, the water that falls on various prop-
erties in the city will become part of the stormwater process and will 
eventually flow through the watershed and be discharged.75 The Court’s 
reasoning that the stormwater fee was actually a tax because it was im-
posed on those who did not directly benefit, or at least that the benefit 
was no different than that of the general public,76 is not sound when 
stormwater science shows that all properties within a city contribute to 
and receive a general and specific benefit from a stormwater manage-
ment system. The general benefit that the Court, in a way, recognizes is 
that all people in a watershed benefit from reducing pollutant levels dis-
charged into nearby waters.77 The particular benefit that the Court does 
not recognize is that every property has a stormwater discharge that it 
contributes to the stormwater problem, and a stormwater system reduc-
es the impact each individual property has on the environment. 
Furthermore, the Court errs when it reasons that because some 
property owners could conceivably contain all of their stormwater on 
site and therefore would not benefit from the stormwater system, they 
are paying for a service that they do not use and are being taxed.78 
There are two reasons for this error. First, in relation to the idea that all 
properties create stormwater, it would be a very rare circumstance that 
                                                     
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. at 2. 
 73. Id. at 49–50. 
 74. See Watersheds and Drainage Basing, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (May 23, 2013, 
2:09 PM), http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/watershed.html. 
 75. See FERGUSON, supra note 57, at 2. 
 76. Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Lewiston, 264 P.3d 907, 913, 151 
Idaho 800, 806 (2011). 
 77. The Court in Lewiston Independent School District recognizes that everyone 
benefits from stormwater management in reducing the pollutant discharge from the city. See 
id. at 913, 151 Idaho at 806. However, this benefit is only one of many that the public gains 
from stormwater management. The water quality impairment of the nation’s waters is only 
one stormwater problem; there are other impairments such as fundamental changes in flow 
regime, energy inputs into water bodies, and alteration of aquatic habitats. See NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 69, at 22. Arguably, reduction of these other stormwater 
problems is also a benefit to the public that live in a watershed. 
 78. Lewiston, 264 P.3d at 914, 151 Idaho at 807. 
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a property could contain all of its stormwater on site.79 The common 
forms of on-site retention, such as retention basins, merely slow the rate 
of flow; they do not reduce the volume of flow.80 This is one reason why 
individual stormwater control measures are seen as less favorable com-
pared to comprehensive stormwater management covering an entire 
watershed.81 Second, in the rare case that someone could actually retain 
all stormwater on site, this would be so out of the ordinary that the 
Court should not invalidate the fee on that basis. As was already said in 
Kootenai County, while it is possible that a residence might not produce 
any solid waste, it is not reasonable to invalidate the fee on this basis.82 
3. The Court failed to recognize the legal regime of the CWA 
If the Court had recognized the legal regime of the CWA, it would 
likely have helped the Court find the stormwater fee valid. The CWA 
begins addressing the issue of pollution by making any discharge of pol-
lution illegal.83 It then sets out a number of exceptions, such as the 
NPDES-permitting statute, which allows discharge of highly restricted 
levels of pollutants.84 It is only after one receives a permit that they are 
allowed to discharge any pollutants, including stormwater.85 
This structure set forth in the CWA likely gives the City of Lewis-
ton the power to enforce a stormwater fee on all property owners. Hypo-
thetically, if Lewiston had no stormwater system in place, each individ-
ual landowner would have to comply with the CWA on their own, clean-
ing and discharging their stormwater in compliance with the CWA. If 
the city then built a stormwater system and charged any landowner a 
fee for utilizing the city’s system rather than their own, the Court would 
be more likely to find the fee valid. The city stormwater system should 
not be viewed as a general service to the public, but the alternative to 
each individual landowner dealing with the problem of their individual 
stormwater discharge. Indeed, the Court says that a fee for use of a sys-
tem is a valid act for a city, especially in relation to police powers.86 The 
police powers have been recognized in Idaho as bearing on public health, 
safety, morals, and general welfare.87 Because the CWA is essentially a 
health and public welfare statute,88 and managing stormwater is com-
                                                     
 79. See FERGUSON, supra note 57, at 164. 
 80. Id. 
 81. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 69, at 457. 
 82. Kootenai Cnty. Prop. Ass’n v. Kootenai County., 769 P.2d 553, 556, 115 Idaho 
676, 679 (1989). 
 83. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006). 
 84. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Lewiston, 264 P.3d 907, 911–912, 151 
Idaho 800, 804–805 (2011). 
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 88. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). 
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monly seen as a public health and safety concern,89 a fee imposed for the 
use of a stormwater system only makes sense. 
It also makes sense, in light of stormwater science, to impose the 
fee on all property owners unless they can prove that they really contain 
all of their stormwater on-site. Because it is almost a certainty that eve-
ry property will discharge stormwater,90 it was unwise for the Court to 
invalidate a fee for use of a stormwater system based on the rare case of 
a property owner actually being able to contain all of her stormwater.91 
Admittedly, the City seemed to concede the idea that some people in the 
city did not use the stormwater system, which likely led the Court in the 
wrong direction.92 
Overall, if the situation in Lewiston Independent School District 
had been presented to the Court in different packaging, the Court could 
have come to a better-reasoned conclusion. The City of Lewiston should 
have presented the structure of the stormwater permitting system of the 
CWA and the real science behind the problem of stormwater, so the 
Court could have understood the situation on the ground in Lewiston. 
Instead, the issue presented was the difference between a tax and a fee, 
which ultimately was not the issue the Court should have been con-
cerned with.93 
III. OBSTACLES TO PAYING FOR FEDERALLY MANDATED 
SYSTEMS 
Understanding the obstacles that local governments face in paying 
for federally mandated systems goes beyond just understanding the le-
gal obstacles. This section will discuss several obstacles, both legal and 
practical, and will lead into the next section that gives solutions to these 
interrelated problems. 
                                                     
 89. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL supra note 69, at 21–25. 
 90. See FERGUSON, supra note 57. 
 91. This opinion seems to be supported by the Idaho Supreme Court’s own decision 
in Kootenai Cnty. Prop. Ass’n v. Kootenai Cnty., 769 P.2d 553, 556, 115 Idaho 676, 679 
(1989) (holding that a “solid waste disposal ‘fee’ for residential dwellings is reasonably relat-
ed to the services rendered by the county in acquiring, establishing, maintaining and operat-
ing its solid waste disposal system.”). 
 92. Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Lewiston, 264 P.3d 907, 914, 151 
Idaho 800, 807 (2011). 
 93. See generally Kootenai Cnty. Prop. Ass’n v. Kootenai Cnty., 115 Idaho 676, 677, 
769 P.2d 553, 554 (1989) (holding that the “solid waste disposal charge . . . is a reasonable 
‘fee’ for services as authorized by I.C. § 31–4404, and is not an invalid ‘tax’ within the mean-
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A. Cost 
1. The financial situation of municipalities nationwide 
Federal mandates in particular seem to hold a special place of gen-
eral dislike for many U.S. cities when it comes to budgetary concerns.94 
But the source of financial stress for each city in America can vary 
greatly, and there are competing theories as to what is the most signifi-
cant source of financial stress. 
Some scholars have theorized that the major reason cities experi-
ence financial crises is because of outside pressures, including socioeco-
nomic forces such as the national economy, suburbanization, population 
changes, and intergovernmental policies.95 This lends to the idea that at 
least some of the financial strain put on municipalities is due to federal 
policies and mandates that put costly requirements on local govern-
ments. 
Another school of thought believes that local political and financial 
management are the causes of municipal financial troubles.96 This theo-
ry does not ignore outside political influence, but would say, rather, that 
the major reason for financial instability in cities is due to local officials’ 
decision-making and the political climate of a city.97 Essentially, the in-
competence of officials, the competition of many different interest 
groups within a city, and the decentralization of budget-making deci-
sions are the main causes of municipal financial woes.98 
While the competing theories seem to suggest a large number of is-
sues that can potentially contribute to municipal fiscal strain, neither 
theory denies the potential of federal mandates to put a burden, wheth-
er large or small, on municipalities.99 In any case, as has been already 
mentioned, the impact of federal mandates on U.S. cities is a concern for 
local governments in a cash-strapped economy.100 
                                                     
 94. See Michael Lamendola, Federal Sign Mandates Have Many Towns Seeing 
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2. The history of federal mandates 
The role of the federal government in shaping and implementing 
national public policy cannot be overstated. During the last half of the 
twentieth century, the federal government increased its role in regulat-
ing the states through federal legislation.101 In many cases, the means of 
implementing national policy were federal mandates.102 
The rise of federal mandates is generally viewed to have grown out 
of the era of the Great Depression and The New Deal when there was an 
increase in joint federal and state programs implemented to address the 
fiscal crisis gripping the nation at the time.103 At that time, there was 
little opposition to the increase in federal regulation and widespread 
support of the programs by the public.104 By the late 1970s, there were 
rumblings about the burden of federal mandates on state and local gov-
ernments.105 However, Congress’s first major response to its own seem-
ingly unfettered ability to impose federal mandates came much later, in 
the form of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.106 
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) was passed in an ef-
fort, “to end the imposition, in the absence of full consideration by Con-
gress, of Federal mandates on State, local, and tribal governments with-
out adequate Federal funding, in a manner that may displace other es-
sential State, local, and tribal governmental priorities.”107 This step to-
ward curbing the power of the federal government to impose unfunded 
mandates on local governments seems to have, at least in the beginning, 
had the desired effect.108 Between 1996 and 1999, only twenty-nine bills 
were introduced in the Legislature with intergovernmental mandates 
included in them, and of those, only two were enacted.109 However, over 
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time it has become clear that exemptions to the UMRA and the limited 
role of judicial review in the Act have taken some of the Act’s original 
power from it.110 This weakness was apparent from the outset because a 
clear reading of the law shows that UMRA was not really a prohibition 
from enacting federal mandates, but rather a set of roadblocks that can 
be overcome in enacting federal mandates.111 
3. Quantifying the cost of federal mandates 
Following our Lewiston example, a 2008 report to Congress by the 
EPA on stormwater and wastewater funding needs showed that there 
exists a nationwide funding gap for capital infrastructure projects in 
wastewater and stormwater systems.112 Another source states, 
“[w]ithout a doubt, the biggest challenge for states, regions, and munici-
palities is having adequate fiscal resources dedicated to implement the 
stormwater program.”113 While this seems to give at least a taste of how 
federal mandates create costs nationwide, scholars differ widely on how 
the cost of federal mandates should be calculated. While some try to add 
up the costs in a dollars-out approach, others balance the values of bene-
fits and costs.114 
To begin examining federal mandates, it is important to under-
stand that not every federal mandate is created equal. Some federal 
mandates are considered unfunded while others are partially funded or, 
sometimes, fully funded.115 
Even though the idea of varying funding levels of federal mandates 
seems like a fairly sound idea to stand on, the issue is not so simple. De-
fining a mandate as unfunded, partially funded, or fully funded is not 
enough for some scholars. While it may seem obvious that a mandate 
either has federal funding or it does not, another school of thought be-
lieves the funding of a mandate should be viewed holistically.116 This 
view proposes taking into account the costs of federal mandates and all 
other costs of entitlement programs and services for state and municipal 
residents and setting off those costs by all federal benefits paid to or 
taken in tax benefits by states, municipalities, and individual resi-
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dents.117 From this viewpoint, states and municipalities are net benefi-
ciaries of federal funds and tax breaks.118 
On the other side of the argument, some scholars see the total cost 
of federal mandates as being undervalued because certain hidden costs 
are not taken into account.119 These costs include forgone opportunity 
costs and regulatory uncertainty costs.120 Essentially, the cost of federal 
mandates includes both the actual out-of-pocket compliance costs and 
the costs that are incurred any time compliance with federal law might 
create inefficiency.121 The difficulty here, again, is that when the costs 
and benefits are less tangible, such as the cost of a city trying to imple-
ment a federal system that it does not understand or the benefit of re-
duced pollution,122 the understanding of whether a federal mandate re-
ally burdens a city can become mired in competing arguments. 
This article argues that the better approach is to focus on the quan-
tifiable cost of compliance for a municipality. The reason for this is prac-
tical in nature. Trying to adjust the cost of federal mandates according 
to factors that are unidentifiable or difficult to place a value on gets 
away from the reality that cities are required to implement federally 
mandated systems and they then have to allocate funds to pay for these 
systems. The net benefit that might come from federal funds or envi-
ronmental services, while valid, does not change the fiscal reality that 
cities have difficulty balancing their budgets to pay for regular munici-
pal services, let alone federal mandates. 
B. State and Local Power Conflict 
As was stated in the introduction, municipalities in Idaho find 
themselves under both federal pressures and state restrictions.123 The 
history in Idaho has shown a push toward more local power, but for the 
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122. Finding the economic value of having a healthy ecosystem has been the subject 
of many scholarly studies. Assigning value to marketed goods coming from the environment 
is a relatively straightforward analysis because a market exists for those goods. It becomes 
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RES. & ENV’T. 179, 182 (2000). Some scholars will value these services by equating the ser-
vice provided by the environment with what it would cost to provide the same service artifi-
cially. Id. at 180. Overall, the methods of valuing environmental services are not consistent 
and therefore the job of valuing the benefit of environmental mandates meant to improve 
ecosystem health is still a difficult one. Id. at 183. 
123. See supra Part I.  
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most part, state courts have strictly limited the power of local govern-
ments.124 The traditional view of municipalities, the view that asserts 
that municipalities are merely appendages to the state, is recognized in 
Idaho history.125 A 1940 commentary on government in Idaho states 
that: 
The State is the sovereign people acting in a governmental ca-
pacity. To fulfill many of the functions of the State, some of 
which are purely local in their applications, the Constitution 
and the laws set up numerous self-governing smaller units for 
special purposes; these units, however, are purely creatures of 
the State, subordinate to it.126 
The essential problem regarding state and local power is that, at 
least in Idaho, municipalities are only allowed to act in areas where 
they have been given authority, as opposed to other states that allow a 
municipality to act in any arena not prohibited by statute.127 This is the 
distinction between a Dillon’s Rule state and a Home Rule state.128 Ob-
viously, in any case where a municipality is seeking to have the power to 
accomplish something, it is more likely to find that power in a state that 
interprets municipal power as anything not prohibited rather than only 
specifically enumerated powers. 
C. Knowledge and Means to Reduce Cost 
A common call to action in any organization that is trying to be 
successful is this: costs must be reduced and efficiency increased. Some-
times increasing efficiency can be enough to bring an organization out of 
financial stress and more drastic measures can be avoided. Often, the 
only obstacle in the way of reducing costs and increasing efficiency is 
knowledge. 
Idaho cities can potentially reduce the cost of environmental pro-
tection systems by increasing the system’s efficiency and decreasing the 
load put on it from the community.129 These cities may or may not have 
the power to reduce these costs or change rate structures to incentivize 
the public to reduce service loads, but increased efficiency does have the 
potential to change the landscape of funding issues for federal environ-
mental systems. 
IV. SOLUTIONS 
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The solutions to funding federal environmental mandates are var-
ied, and each solution has its advantages and disadvantages. The thrust 
of this article is that these solutions can be applied individually or in 
concert with each other as a comprehensive way of addressing the needs 
of individual municipalities. 
This article first proposes that local lawmakers can potentially 
craft an ordinance that comports with Lewiston Independent School 
District when the criticisms of the case are taken into account.130 This 
approach gives the city a stronger place to begin writing an ordinance 
and a stronger position to defend the ordinance if it is challenged on im-
permissible tax grounds. 
At a conference in Boise, Idaho, in July of 2012, a number of solu-
tions were proposed that addressed specifically raising funds for storm-
water management, the very issue presented in Lewiston Independent 
School District.131 These solutions can be applied to municipal storm-
water funding in Idaho, but some concepts discussed could be applied 
generally to municipal funding for mandates in general. I will address 
first the solutions addressed at the conference and then others that have 
been proposed before. The conference proposed four solutions: do noth-
ing, create a local ordinance that can comport with Lewiston (which has 
already been mentioned), seek statutory authority from the state legis-
lature to levy taxes, and seek a constitutional amendment granting 
more authority.132 
A. Do Nothing 
What exactly does “do nothing” mean? Do nothing means what it 
expressly says: do nothing. The basic question that backs up this ap-
proach is, “what bad would really come if we just went along with this 
Idaho Supreme Court decision and left cities in the position they are 
already in?” The answer given during the conference in Boise is that 
this approach is not economically viable.133 If nothing is done, the finan-
cial burdens some cities are under will not go away. In the most recent 
report to Congress by the EPA regarding clean watershed needs, the 
EPA reported that the nation is experiencing a capital funding gap for 
wastewater and stormwater management infrastructure needs.134 This 
is just one example of the nationwide strain being put on states and es-
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pecially municipalities by unfunded and underfunded federal mandates. 
Federal mandates can put strains on cities in many realms from the en-
vironment to education to employment, and cities are feeling the 
strain.135 Barring unforeseen improvements in the status quo regarding 
municipal funding of federal mandates and the state restrictions on 
municipal actions, there does not seem to be an end to the financial 
stresses for cities imposed by federal mandates. 
B. Create a Local Ordinance that Can Comport with Lewiston 
Independent School District 
In light of the criticism already mentioned of the decision in Lewis-
ton Independent School District, there exists an opportunity for munici-
palities to create local ordinances that can comport with the require-
ments laid out in the case.136 The safest way to create an ordinance that 
comports with the Loomis test would be to take each part of the Loomis 
test separately and make sure both are met.137 The way the test is struc-
tured, a fee will be deemed impermissible by the court without much 
difficulty if it is structured like a tax.138 If the court decides it is not a 
tax, it still must pass the test of being reasonably related to a regulatory 
purpose.139 Thus, the approach this paper presents will suggest first, 
how to avoid the tax/fee issue, and second, how to make sure the ordi-
nance has the required nexus between the fee and regulatory purposes. 
1. Avoiding the tax/fee issue 
To avoid the tax/fee issue, a city drafting an ordinance to pay for 
federally mandated systems will have to be aware of how the courts in 
Idaho have distinguished between the two. There are two fundamental 
characteristics of a tax that, if present in a purported fee, have led 
courts to find the fee to be a tax.140 These two main characteristics are 
(1) the fee’s major purpose is to generate revenue and (2) the fee is im-
posed on those who do not directly benefit from the service, or in other 
words, the benefit is to the public generally and not to the fee payers for 
a specific good or service.141 These two characteristics are basically two 
sides to the same coin. However, a court might look at either character-
istic, determine it is present, and then infer that the other side of the 
coin also exists. The case law does not restrict a court in how it deter-
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mines a fee is a tax. However, generally the courts will argue that if one 
characteristic exists, it is enough to say that the other also exists, and 
therefore the fee is a tax.142 As has been already stated, the courts treat 
the analysis like a duck test: if it looks like a duck, and swims like a 
duck, and quacks like a duck, it is a duck. If something called a fee has 
tax characteristics, it is a tax.143 
Now it is helpful to examine Idaho cases that have analyzed the 
tax/fee issue. In the foundational case of Brewster v. City of Pocatello,144 
the Court took up the issue of a street fee for property owners based on 
the amount of traffic a certain property was estimated to generate. Es-
sential to the Court’s reasoning was to determine what was the privilege 
or benefit to payers of the fee.145 The Court said that the privilege was 
having a public street abut their property.146 This privilege, the Court 
said, was, “in no respect different from the privilege shared by the gen-
eral public in the usage of public streets.”147 The Court pointed out the 
difference between a tax and a fee was that a fee is for a direct public 
service and a tax is a forced contribution by the public at large to meet 
public needs.148 The Court found that it was clear in this case that the 
“ordinance in question is not designed for the regulation of traffic under 
the police power, but rather clearly a revenue raising measure.”149 It 
seems that the Court here first determined that the privilege provided 
was a general privilege and then, seeing that there was no other regula-
tory purpose for the fee, determined that it could only be a revenue gen-
erating tax. This is the Court looking at the second characteristic of a 
hidden tax, that the fee is providing a benefit to the payer that is no dif-
ferent than a benefit to the general public. Then after determining that 
the fee has the second characteristic, the Court logically concludes that 
the fee has the first characteristic of being primarily concerned with 
raising revenue. 
Courts have made essentially the same determination in the re-
verse order. The Court went through this type of reasoning in Lewiston 
Independent School District. The Court cited to evidence in the ordi-
nance, literature on the ordinance, and testimony on the ordinance that 
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stated that the major purpose of the fee was to raise revenue.150 After 
giving all the examples of how the ordinance was primarily concerned 
with raising revenue, the Court determined that the revenues raised 
had no relation to a specific service or commodity provided to the payer 
that was different than the rest of the community.151 Examples of other 
Idaho cases that deal with the first step of the Loomis test have similar 
analyses.152 
2. Fulfilling the nexus requirement 
The case law seems to show that if a fee can pass the test of being a 
regulatory fee rather than a tax, the court is likely to find that the fee 
passes the second part of the Loomis test. However, there must be a 
requisite nexus between the fee and the regulation.153 The nexus re-
quirement identifies two main characteristics of a valid fee: first, that 
the fee has a regulatory purpose; and second, that the fee is reasonably 
and rationally related to the regulatory purpose.154 Generally, cities will 
rely (successfully or unsuccessfully) on police powers as the authority to 
collect a fee related to regulatory power granted by the police power.155 
Idaho courts have not sufficiently explored the validity of other munici-
pal fees based on different legislation sufficiently to make any real 
comment on this situation, but theoretically the same nexus would have 
to be found between the fee and the regulatory purpose in those cases as 
well. The reasonableness and rationality of a fee is a matter for the 
court to decide, but courts will not overturn a municipal ordinance made 
pursuant to legislation regarding local health and welfare unless it is 
shown to be “clearly unreasonable or arbitrary.”156 
Despite the ability of the courts to use various methods to find a fee 
to be a hidden tax, therefore avoiding the nexus analysis, there are Ida-
ho cases that examine the nexus requirement. In Kootenai County 
Property Association v. Kootenai County, the Court analyzed a county 
ordinance that collected garbage disposal fees.157 The fee in this case 
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was authorized by statute.158 The county imposed the fee on all property 
owners whether they used the county garbage disposal or not.159 While 
the plaintiffs in this case argued that this characteristic of charging 
those who did not receive a direct service made the fee a tax, the Court 
pointed out that all residences in the county create waste and that 
whether they use the county disposal system or some other system, the 
waste ends up in the county landfill.160 Because the county was empow-
ered by a state statute to acquire and maintain landfill sites and do all 
other functions necessary to maintain a solid waste disposal system, 
each residence has a specific benefit from the county regulation.161 The 
Court goes on to point out how the fee is charged differently for house-
holds of elderly or poor people because studies show that they generate 
less waste.162 This made the fees proportionate to the cost of regulating 
a system required by the legislature. Ultimately, the plaintiffs’ argu-
ments failed because the fee seemed to comport with the legislation and 
was not so unreasonable and arbitrary to warrant any deeper scruti-
ny.163 
In Loomis, the city based its water and sewer hook-up fee on its po-
lice powers and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.164 The Court in Loomis 
found that the fees, which were for a connection to a sewer and water 
system, were not taxes and were based on the city’s police powers and in 
accord with the Revenue Bond Act.165 Furthermore, the rate for the fees 
was based on an “equity buy-in” structure that comported with the Rev-
enue Bond Act.166 By virtue of the equity buy-in structure, the fees for 
hook up were reasonably related to the total cost of the system.167 The 
Court found cost to be reasonable by saying that the fees collected were 
kept separate from general funds and were not used for anything other 
than the cost of the system.168 Essentially, the fees paid for the regula-
tion and nothing else. If the fees would have raised funds for other pur-
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poses, the Court would have likely determined that it was a tax and 
would not have needed to determine the nexus requirement. Here, how-
ever, the Court found both characteristics of the nexus test. The fee was 
authorized by statute and the fee structure was reasonably related to 
the regulatory purpose of the statute because the cost was based on the 
cost of the system.169 
3. Proposed approach to local ordinance drafting 
In any case, where cities in Idaho want to assess fees to pay for the 
costs of federally mandated systems, they will have to satisfy the re-
quirements of the Loomis test. Remembering Lewiston Independent 
School District, and the way the issue was framed as a tax/fee issue, is 
key to knowing how to draft an ordinance that can comport with the 
test. The key problem with the ordinance in Lewiston was that it was 
presented to the Court solely as the issue of whether the fee was a tax. 
Because the city gave no context to the Court of the science and problem 
behind stormwater, it could not present to the Court the reason it could 
assess the fees on all property owners regardless of their actual contri-
bution to the stormwater system. This article suggests that if cities are 
in a position that they want to or have to raise revenue to pay for federal 
mandates, they will be safest following these steps. 
First, look to the Idaho statutes and see what kind of power has 
been given to cities to raise revenue in relation to a regulatory activity. 
Starting out with a statute or constitutional provision that grants mu-
nicipal authority is basically a given in local lawmaking in Idaho.170 A 
city will then have to decide how to draft an ordinance that passes the 
Loomis test. The structure of the fee must avoid the characteristics of a 
tax and have the required nexus between the fee and the regulatory ac-
tivity. While this may seem to be a straight forward process, we see in 
Idaho’s history the same pattern repeated of cities trying to impose a fee 
and being rejected by the courts. 
Avoiding the tax/fee distinction and finding the required nexus is 
likely to be found in reviewing the criticisms of the Lewiston Independ-
ent School District decision in this article.171 Essentially, packaging the 
fee in a way that shows the court how there is authority and reason to 
impose the fee is what must be done and what the city failed to do in 
Lewiston Independent School District. Comparing the different out-
comes in Lewiston Independent School District and Kootenai County 
helps show how a city would present a fee more effectively. The key dif-
ference between why Lewiston’s stormwater fee was invalid and Koote-
nai County’s solid waste fee was valid is the presumption made in Koo-
tenai County that all residences create waste. If the city of Lewiston 
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could have presented the Court with the argument that all property cre-
ates stormwater, it would have had a better chance of having its fee up-
held. Again, this is done in the stormwater context through the explana-
tion of stormwater science and study of the legal regime of the CWA. 
It is important to note here that any local ordinance written, 
whether according to this proposed approach or any other approach, is 
still vulnerable to attack by those opposing the ordinance. No matter 
how well drafted an ordinance is, every theoretical ordinance could fail 
the Loomis test, and a local government takes the risk in drafting an 
ordinance that assesses a fee that the fee will be found a tax. Until local 
ordinances assessing fees in particular areas—such as stormwater—
begin to garner support by the courts, the likelihood of an ordinance be-
ing found valid is difficult to predict. 
C. Statutory Authority to Levy Taxes and Impose Fees 
Garnering the statutory authority to levy taxes is one route, albeit 
a more difficult route in all likelihood, for cities to address their need to 
fund federally mandated systems. As was made clear in Lewiston Inde-
pendent School District, the authority to levy taxes in Idaho is held by 
the state legislature, and any power for a municipality to impose a tax 
must be first approved by the same.172 In Idaho, there are two constitu-
tionally accepted ways of taking legislative action: the traditional legis-
lative process and the initiative process. Each is a possible way for cities 
to find the authority needed to impose taxes for the federally mandated 
systems. However, each path can be a difficult one to walk. 
1. The traditional legislative process 
In general, the legislative process in Idaho does not greatly differ 
from the traditional approach used in almost every state legislature and 
in Congress. Idaho has a bicameral legislature “with a senate composed 
of thirty-five members and a house of representatives composed of sev-
enty members.”173 The Legislature meets in annual sessions with ses-
sions lasting about three months—a relatively short session compared 
to other states.174 
The process of proposed legislation becoming state law is also not 
uncommon. Bills are introduced in both the House and Senate at a read-
ing.175 From there, bills are sent to committees to be considered, changes 
are proposed and made, the bills are re-read in front of the Legislature 
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as a whole, and then the bills are voted on.176 Lastly, the governor holds 
the power to veto laws passed by the Legislature.177 
Little more needs to be said about the legislative process in Idaho 
for the purposes of this article. However, perhaps more important than 
the process of legislation are the people involved in legislation, because 
any hope of using the traditional legislative approach to gain statutory 
authority to levy taxes and address federal mandates is dependent on 
gaining the ear of the legislators. Idaho is known as a state with a 
smaller legislature, made up of part-time senators and representatives 
who are closer to the people and represent smaller districts.178 Both 
senators and representatives serve two-year terms rather than stagger-
ing the terms.179 This potentially means that the needs of local govern-
ments and local needs in general will receive more attention from the 
Idaho Legislature, a legislature closer to the people. 
2. Initiative lawmaking 
In Idaho, the process of presenting initiatives for a public vote has 
the power to implement laws that have the force of laws made through 
the legislative process, but none of the restrictions of the legislative pro-
cess.180 The process is part of the Idaho Constitution.181 The people have 
reserved it to themselves and it is becoming a more popular way of ex-
pressing the people’s intent nationwide.182 Although the constitutional 
amendment authorizing the initiative and referendum were adopted in 
1912, the laws giving the structure of the process were not enacted until 
the 1933 Legislature.183 Despite the increased popularity of the initia-
tive lawmaking process, Idaho has only seen thirty-five such instances 
of attempted popular lawmaking since the first referendum in 1936.184 
Of those thirty-five instances, seven were referenda from the Legisla-
ture to the people and the rest were public initiatives.185 Of all thirty-
five proposed laws, the enactment rate has been about half, with sixteen 
laws being approved by the public.186 A brief look at the proposed legis-
lation shows a wide variety of issues addressed including sales and 
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property tax, liquor, gambling, nuclear energy, hunting, same sex mar-
riage, eminent domain restrictions, and, from the most recent voting 
cycle, education.187 
Legislation by the voice of the people is a curious area of the law. 
One main question is how the courts in Idaho will treat any possible 
public initiative regarding taxes for federally mandated systems. There 
seems to be no obvious evidence that Idaho courts interpret initiatives 
differently than other legislation, but there are arguments that because 
initiatives do not undergo the rigorous process of traditional legisla-
tion—with extensive drafting changes, committee meetings to discuss 
the law, and all other legislative processes that are considered refining 
safeguards—they should be interpreted differently by courts.188 Normal-
ly, the actual text is the starting point of interpretation in most cases, 
but some scholars suggest that voter intent should be more heavily scru-
tinized than the actual language of an initiative because very specific 
support groups generally draft initiatives.189 This is significant because 
any initiative passed by the people that would give cities more local 
power to fund federally mandated systems could come under judicial 
scrutiny. The drafting of such an initiative, along with voters’ pamphlets 
and other information that would prove voter intent all need to be done 
in such a way that the law could not be interpreted by the court to be 
ineffective in what the law is trying to do. 
3. Imposing taxes and fees and public reaction 
An important factor to consider when raising taxes or imposing fees 
is how the public will react to the increased costs.190 This is because 
public support of a tax or fee is important not only in the realm of future 
compliance with the tax, but also in the realm of gaining public support 
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to give cities the power to impose taxes through the initiative process.191 
Therefore, determining the subject matter of the tax or fee, and also the 
likelihood the public will support the increased cost, is important to con-
sider in crafting the law before presenting it to the public. 
Public reaction to tax increases is almost universally negative.192 
Even when a tax is not likely to affect an individual, he or she is likely 
to oppose tax increases.193 “As Pavlov’s dogs were conditioned to salivate 
at the sound of the bell, we have been conditioned to feel angry at the 
sound of the word ‘tax.’”194 
Not only does the public at large have a generally negative view of 
taxes, but tax scholars tend to study taxes from the perspective of how 
taxes burden individuals and the public generally.195 
People generally view taxes negatively because they focus on the 
taking aspect of taxes.196 As one scholar summed up, 
The vast majority of the time, we (1) associate taxes with reve-
nue collection, (2) evaluate taxes with respect to their economic 
effects and (3) tax people based on their economic characteris-
tics. We think of taxes as nonnormative, which leads us to gen-
erate tax bases not related to behavioral norms. Then, because 
we choose to tax economically productive behaviors rather than 
immoral ones, tax laws appear to lack moral legitimacy. This, in 
turn, further convinces us that we were right to think that taxes 
are essentially nothing more than the tools of governmental tak-
ing, and reinforces our attention to the taking done by taxes.197 
There are a number of ideas of how to improve the public percep-
tion of taxes. Improving public perception of taxes can be accomplished 
by shifting the focus on the taking aspect of taxes to the benefits of tax-
es.198 One scholar believes that positive role models of taxpaying could 
improve the public perception of a tax.199 Another study analyzes how 
trust in government impacts the public’s willingness to comply with tax-
es.200 In that study, the scholars concluded that even after controlling 
for fear of being caught not paying taxes and a feeling of public duty, 
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trust in the government increases the public’s willingness to pay tax-
es.201 
All of these approaches to improving the public perception of taxes 
can be considered in deciding how to approach the public with new taxes 
and fees. Specifically, an attempt by municipalities to increase costs on 
the public, or garner the support of the public to gain the authority to 
impose taxes or fees by public initiative, should involve an analysis of 
how the subject matter of the taxing can best be presented to the public. 
This analysis will help municipalities to be more successful in taking 
this path to address their financial troubles related to federal mandates. 
4. Public feeling toward environmental issues 
Because this article deals with municipal funding of federal man-
dates under the general framework of addressing federally mandated 
environmental systems, here the article will look at how environmental 
issues in particular may be issues that could garner public support in 
the area of taxation. 
Increasing taxes or imposing fees to pay for environmental issues 
may be an area where the public is willing to look past the negative im-
pact of the costs and look more readily to the benefits. Since the 1970s, 
the environment has taken a “prominent, and seemingly permanent, 
place on the public agenda” and in the political realm.202 
The public perception of environmental issues since environmental-
ism’s rise to prominence in the seventies may be waning, but support for 
environmental change increases in the face of environmental crises such 
as major oil spills or natural disasters.203 Unless environmental issues 
are repeatedly dramatized and personalized, the public seems to be un-
able to hold its attention on environmental issues long enough to effect 
any major change.204 This indicates the public’s tendency toward latent 
environmentalism, which shows its power only when the public is suffi-
ciently incensed by environmental problems.205 At the same time, the 
lessons of the beginnings of the environmental movement can be in-
structive in passing future legislation regarding environmental man-
dates. 
In Idaho, environmental protection has traditionally been viewed 
by most Idahoans to be a major concern.206 However, much of the politi-
cal debate over environmental protection in Idaho has been focused on 
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nuclear development and the Idaho National Laboratory.207 It is not 
clear if addressing environmental mandates is the type of environmen-
tal issue Idahoans are likely to be concerned with. 
5. Hypothetical application of principles to environmental mandates 
For those who would choose to take the path of trying to gain the 
authority for municipalities to assess taxes or impose fees in response to 
environmental mandates, the first decision is whether to appeal to the 
legislature or to choose the initiative process. As has been discussed, 
appealing to the legislature is a practice in gaining the ear of the legis-
lature. One who wishes to follow the traditional path of legislation can 
hope for greater access in Idaho because of the closeness of legislators to 
their constituents, but gaining the margin of approval needed to give 
local governments discretion in how to address the financial strains of 
environmental mandates is speculative. Suffice it to say that with the 
mixture of both environmental issues and local government issues, leg-
islation proposed in this area is likely to be complicated. 
The initiative process as a second choice is also a difficult road to 
travel. Especially in the realm of municipal power, the issue must be 
presented to the public in the most appealing way possible in order to 
garner the support necessary to pass the initiative. The history of Ida-
ho’s initiative lawmaking shows no easily recognizable trend that would 
indicate if environmental mandates and municipal power would or 
would not draw the attention of the public enough to receive enough 
support to pass any kind of legislation. Both governmental authority 
and environmental issues have been previously addressed through the 
initiative process,208 but the only evident trend in initiative lawmaking 
is that the issues addressed in the lawmaking have risen to a level of 
public prominence such that some portion of the public would, at that 
time, be inclined to vote on measures directly concerning the issues. The 
one rule, then, to take away from the idea of going down the initiative 
lawmaking path is that public awareness of the issue—whether through 
natural forces or through the efforts of activists— must reach a certain 
level and then it is up to those in support of new laws to carpe diem and 
ride the wave of public support to pass the proposed laws. 
As has been discussed, it is important for the municipal power ac-
tivist to address the concerns of the public and avoid the stigma of taxa-
tion. Especially in the realm of the environment, taking advantage of 
the public’s general support of environmentalism can be a way to over-
come the stigma of taxation. Positive examples of taxpaying and focus-
ing on the benefits of the municipal taxing authority will be key to help-
ing garner public support. This is mostly an exercise in public relations, 
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but it is important to consider whenever legal issues and the general 
public intersect. 
D. Attempting to Change the State Constitution: Home Rule 
Cities in America have traditionally been creatures of, or append-
ages to, the state. In one statement about Dillon’s Rule, the assumption 
made was that cities are given power by the state, and there is very lit-
tle room outside those grants of power to take any discretionary ac-
tion.209 
Home Rule provisions are set in state constitutions as “mini-Tenth 
Amendments” and set aside certain matters for municipal discretion 
because they are local matters in nature.210 The essential difference, 
then, between states following Dillon’s Rule and those that follow Home 
Rule, is that under Dillon’s Rule, a city may only exercise the powers 
specifically conferred on it while under Home Rule, a city may exercise 
any power not specifically withheld or not in opposition to state law. 
While Home Rule seems an attractive idea, there is some doubt 
that Home Rule can really accomplish what it seems to accomplish at 
face value. With state courts construing Home Rule narrowly, the su-
premacy of state power is even more ominous than the supremacy the 
federal government holds over state governments.211 This could poten-
tially mean that Home Rule is not as powerful as advertised. At the 
same time, when a state authorizes Home Rule, it tends to show a will-
ingness to grant more local authority to local governments. While Home 
Rule might not give a city everything it wants, it still seems to be a step 
in the right direction for those who support greater local authority. 
In Idaho, there have been many calls to give Home Rule power to 
local governments.212 However, a leading study ranked Idaho fiftieth 
among states in the amount of local discretionary authority granted to 
cities and other branches of local government.213 
The provision in the Idaho Constitution that seems to grant Home 
Rule power214 is generally construed as granting Home Rule power in 
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police powers only.215 The courts have not looked at the provision as 
granting the same level of authority that other states have granted in 
their Home Rule provisions, even though the language of the provisions 
are nearly identical.216 
Another important Idaho law regarding Home Rule is § 50–301 of 
the Idaho Code. This section originally seems to have stated that the 
power of local governments was governed by Dillon’s Rule.217 In 1976 
the state legislature amended the section and seemed to be moving to-
ward more Home Rule power, granting authority to municipalities to 
exercise authority in any area not specifically prohibited by the laws of 
the state.218 But courts have continued to interpret the issue as cities 
having limited power, basically because the Act granting Home Rule 
power is only an act and not a constitutional amendment.219 This means 
there is still an opportunity to argue for a greater grant of power to local 
authorities. Home Rule power can probably be implemented through 
convincing the courts to change the current interpretation or petitioning 
the legislature to amend the Constitution to make the provisions in the 
Constitution and Code less ambiguous. 
One argument for granting more Home Rule power is the undue 
burden that federal action has directly on municipalities. One scholar 
asserts that the fact that a mandate is unfunded does not affect its con-
stitutionality.220 However, if a federal mandate threatened a state’s very 
existence, there might be a Tenth Amendment argument to be made 
against the federal mandate.221 This same argument might be extended 
to the effect of federal mandates on cities. The argument would be, es-
sentially, that when a federal mandate threatens the existence of a mu-
nicipality, municipal autonomy is threatened and greater authority 
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should be given to municipalities to address these issues. Any number of 
other arguments could be crafted along this vein—that cities should be 
given more local power based on the need for local power to address lo-
cal needs and crises—however, they all come back to the general prem-
ises of Home Rule: local needs are best addressed by those closest to the 
problem. Unless this idea can permeate more deeply into the legal struc-
ture of Idaho through the legislature and through the courts, the pat-
tern of interpretation of municipal power in Idaho is not likely to 
change. 
E. Implementation of Efficiency Strategies 
Efficiency in municipal organizations is evaluated from multiple 
viewpoints. The two main areas of efficiency in the realm of municipal 
projects are (1) energy and resource efficiency and (2) structural effi-
ciency. A popular area to evaluate efficiency is in the realm of energy 
and resource efficiency.222 
1. Resource efficiency 
Even a superficial survey of both private and public organizations 
will likely indicate a general understanding that energy efficiency is a 
goal sought by all trying to reduce costs. Since the election of President 
Barack Obama in 2008, the White House has encouraged an increase in 
renewable energy sources and an overall increase in energy efficiency.223 
Some of the popularity of the energy efficiency movement may be con-
tributable to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which has 
paid out $30.1 billion in funding to energy and environmental projects 
with an additional $10.9 billion in energy efficiency tax credits and in-
centives and $21.4 billion in energy entitlements since its enactment in 
2009.224 Though many of the tax credits for energy efficiency expired in 
2012, the recent American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 extended many 
energy efficiency tax credits.225 In the coming years it seems that there 
will be an even heightened emphasis put on energy efficiency in Presi-
                                                     
222. See generally NIGEL JOLLANDS, STEPHEN KENIHAN & WAYNE WESCOTT, 
PROMOTING ENERGY EFFICIENCY BEST PRACTICES IN CITIES - A PILOT STUDY, INTERNATIONAL 
ENERGY AGENCY (2008), available at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications 
/publication/cities_bpp-1.pdf. 
223. See Securing American Energy, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/energy/securing-american-energy#energy-menu (last visited April 8, 2014). 
224. Breakdown of Funding by Category, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov 
/arra/Transparency/fundingoverview/Pages/fundingbreakdown.aspx (last visited April 
8, 2014). 
225. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, H.R. 8, 112th Cong. (2012), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr8enr.pdf. 
60 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50 
 
dent Obama’s second term.226 Whatever the source of the emphasis on 
energy and resource efficiency, the general push toward energy efficien-
cy has opened up many avenues of cost saving in the realm of municipal 
projects. 
2. Structural efficiency and efficiency through collaboration 
Some local governments have taken the stance that the best way to 
lower the cost of local government is to downsize the size of government 
or dissolve municipalities.227 This stance garners little support from the 
public.228 Intergovernmental collaboration efforts have been influential 
in reducing the budgetary strains on local governments.229 Collaboration 
is seen as a strong alternative to municipal dissolution or government 
downsizing as a means to reduce local government costs.230 
Intermunicipal cooperation as a means of eliminating inefficiencies 
and capitalizing on economies of scale promises to trim the cost of gov-
ernment, and is far more likely to earn immediate public support than 
consolidation or dissolution of municipalities has. An intergovernmental 
relations council—or any committee of motivated volunteers—offers a 
valuable medium for the exchange, development, and recommendation 
of cost-saving strategies for adoption and implementation by the elected 
officials who serve its sponsoring communities.231 
The basic premise of intergovernmental collaboration is that mu-
nicipalities (or any group of government units) can come together and 
pool resources in an effort to take advantage of sharing personnel, 
equipment, and expertise.232 Another important advantage to intergov-
ernmental collaboration is the ability to take advantage of economies of 
scale savings from pooling resources.233 Overall, the hope is that 
through collaboration, governmental units can create a structure to 
their operations that is more streamlined and cuts extraneous functions 
that increase cost unnecessarily. 
The promise of intergovernmental collaboration, while theoretically 
enticing, still faces obstacles. The main obstacles to intergovernmental 
collaboration are practical and political. Practically, collaboration re-
quires representation from different municipalities to come together and 
find ways that they can work together to decrease costs. In a New Jer-
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sey report on intergovernmental collaboration efforts, the main practical 
reasons for failure to collaborate were because it was “too costly,” “too 
complicated,” and “just not workable.”234 In the same report, the politi-
cal reasons stated for failure to collaborate were that it “infringes on 
‘Home Rule,’” was “too political an issue,” and “citizens objected.”235 
Whatever the obstacles to collaboration, there still seems to be a good 
motivational reason to attempt collaboration with other municipalities 
in providing services, at least when feasible. 
3. Management strategies 
A management strategy that has been gaining popularity for mu-
nicipal projects and utilities is an environmental management system 
(EMS).236 An EMS is a way for a company to assess its environmental 
regulatory demands and address them. The basic elements of an EMS 
are (1) “reviewing the company’s environmental goals,” (2) “analyzing its 
environmental impacts,” (3) “setting environmental objectives and tar-
gets to reduce environmental impacts and comply with legal require-
ments,” (4) “establishing programs to meet these objectives and targets,” 
(5) “monitoring and measuring progress in achieving the objectives,” (6) 
“ensuring employees’ environmental awareness and competence,” and 
(7) “reviewing progress of the EMS and making improvements.”237 
The EPA has put its support behind the implementation of EMSs 
in public and private organizations.238 The EPA itself has been required 
to implement EMSs for many of its facilities.239 The EPA states that an 
EMS does not replace regulatory and enforcement programs, but can 
complement them.240 
One study looked at the costs and benefits to organizations both 
private and public that implemented EMSs.241 The study states that 
Overall benefits of EMS utilization in government facilities in-
cluded better operational control in areas that impact the envi-
ronment; better understanding of the root causes of non-
compliance; improved operational efficiency and cost savings; 
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improved communications within the organization and with out-
side stakeholders and contractors/vendors; and better relation-
ships with regulators and stakeholders.242 
The study showed that EMS implementation in public entities is 
sometimes more difficult because certain barriers come in to play.243 The 
barriers are, “management issues (integrating new approaches in 
strongly bureaucratic organizations); insufficient leadership (visibility 
and involvement from top management); organizational issues (time, 
employee buy-in); lack of public awareness; understanding and buy-in; 
and political uncertainty.”244 The costs of EMS implementation decrease 
as facilities and programs become better at implementing EMSs. Gov-
ernment EMS programs can reduce their costs by applying for EMS as-
sistance programs.245 
Looking into the possibilities of implementing an EMS in a munici-
pal utility or system seems well worth the time. A system that can save 
resources through efficiency, while perhaps difficult to implement, al-
lows a city to address financial needs without needing to appeal to other 
powers for help. And for some cities an EMS could be all that is needed 
to avoid a financial crisis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article attempts to accomplish one main goal: to help local 
government leaders understand the situation they are in when it comes 
to addressing federal mandates in Idaho. It is not always an easy situa-
tion to be in. Pressures from the federal government and restrictions 
from the state government can result in a feeling of being between a 
rock and a hard place. The current situation in Idaho requires local gov-
ernments to take an all-possible-methods approach to addressing the 
financial burdens of federal mandates.246 The case of Lewiston Inde-
pendent School District and previous Idaho case law show that there is 
room for cities to craft ordinances to address their financial needs, but it 
will require that local leaders use the lessons from Lewiston Independ-
ent School District and provide the Court with the context and reason-
ing that the Court requires. At the same time, the Court must recognize 
the position cities are in and see past the formalistic distinctions put 
before it to address the real needs of local governments. 
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